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NOTES
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN ACTIONS FOR UNDISCOVERED MALPRACTICE

Various rules have been applied by the courts in attempting to resolve
the problem of when the statute of limitations in malpractice actions
should commence to run, where there has been a lapse of time between the
commission of the negligent act and its discovery by the patient. The conflict arises in construing the customary statutory phraseology that the action

must be commenced within a certain number of years after the cause of
action accrues. As a result of these different views which are apparently
based on questions of policy, i.e., to what extent the doctor should be protected from potential litigation, this field of the law is somewhat involved.
A majority of the courts base their decisions upon the rule that the
statute of limitations commences to run at the instant of the negligent act,
regardless of when the patient discovers the injury. The majority rule is
based on the questionable theory that discovery of an injury adds nothing
to the cause of action which accrues at the instant of the wrongful act.'
Under this view, it has been stated that the negligent act is not severable
1.

Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919).

[30]
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from its consequences 2 and that future elements of damage attach thentselves to the original cause of action and do not become independent
causes.3 Where a patient is completely ignorant of the fact that a sponge
has been negligently left in his body, it is difficult to perceive what value
can be attached to his theoretical cause of action. Regardless of this
inconsistency, it has been held under these circumstances and where the
patient did not discover the existence of the sponge during the limitation
period, that the statute is a complete bar to the action even though the
damages were only nominal during the period with the serious consequences
completely unforeseen at that time. 4 It would seem that under these conditions, there has been no practical damage until the patient discovers he
has received something during the operation that he did not pay for, namely
a pad of gauze which must be removed in a later operation with additional
pain and suffering.
This unrealistic approach of the majority rule has resulted in "shocking" 5 consequences in many decisions. The Kansas court held a two year
statute had run in an action where radium beads were negligently permitted
to remain in the body of a patient, despite assurances to the contrary,
ultimately resulting in her death six years later, at which time the beads
were discovered. 6 The dissenting judge disapproved of a rule permitting
a doctor to set an agency.such as radium in operation and escape liability
because it takes more than two years for the radium to accomplish the
inevitable end-the death of the patient. Another case involved a pair of
forceps which were left in a patient and not discovered until thirty months
later when one-half of the forceps was discharged from the plaintiff's
bowels. 7 The court held this action was barred under a one year statute
since the cause accrues ".

.

. when a party has the right and capacity to sue,

and his right of action is not suspended until he ascertains that he has a
cause of action."8 'Impractical results such as these have occurred in many
other cases 9 and demonstrate only too well the unreasonable character of
the majority rule.
A well-recognized exception invented to avoid these harsh results in
certain cases tolls the statute until the end of treatment by the physician.
2.

Weinstein v. Blanchard, 109 N.J.L. 332, 162 At. 601

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Gardner v. Beck, 195 Iowa 62, 189 N.W. 962 (1922).
Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919).
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944).
Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936).
Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936).
Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, see note 7 at page 10.
Hudson v. Moore (sponge not discovered for 14 years), 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147
(1940); Giambozi v. Peters (plaintiff contracted syphillis through doctor's failure
to test blood used in a transfusion, although partial recovery was permitted on a
contract theory), 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940); Becker v. Porter (leaving
portion of dental drill in the jaw of plaintiff), 119 Kan. 626, 240 Pac. 584 (1925)
Wilder v. St. Joseph Hospital (sponges not discovered for 10 years),
Miss....
82 So.2d 651 (1955); Weinstein v. Blanchard (drainage tube not discovered for 18
years), 109 N.J.L. 332, 162 Atl. 601 (1932); Lewis v. Shaver (unauthorized removal
of an ovary and the tying of plaintiff's fallopian tubes not discovered for 7 years),
236 N.E. 510, 73 S.E.2d 320 (1952) ; Murray v. Allen (surgical sponge not discovered
for 6 years), 103 Vt. 373, 154 At. 678 (1931).

(1932).
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The end of treatment exception probably first set forth in Gillette v.
Tucker,'0 is based on the theory that so long as the doctor-patient relationship continues the physician has a continuing duty to repair the negligence;
therefore, the cause of action does not accrue until the end of the contractual relationship. Despite the fact that the Harvard Law Journal in
192311 stated that such a result was indefensible and not followed by any
other decisions, it would appear that most of the courts will apply the
end of treatment exception at the present time in a case involving the
necessary factual situation. Recent cases disclose that only four jurisdictions have expressly repudiated the exception.' 2 While some jurisdictions
have limited this exception to situations where the treatment itself has
been negligent 13 or where the treatment has been connected with the
negligent act, 14 these restrictions do not seem to be generally recognized or
specified.
The end of treatment exception, while adding a degree of leniency to
the majority rule, is unavailable in most cases because of the absence of
the necessary factual situation. The wide acceptance of the end of treatment
exception evidences a recognition by the courts that concealment of the
cause of action is more apt to be a result where treatment continues, due
to the confidential relationship between the doctor and his patient. It
must be noted, however, that in the usual case the treatment has not been
of sufficient length to permit an application of the exception. The surgeon
seldom has much to do with the post-operative treatment, and yet most
of the cases deal with foreign materials left in the body of a patient during
an operation. For this reason, the end of treatment exception does not
eliminate the objections to the majority rule, but merely lessens them in
special situations.
Probably all of the courts applying the majority rule will toll the
statute where there is shown to have been a fraudulent concealment of the
cause of action by the physician, together with proof of scienter. Where
the allegations are sufficient to raise the issue of a fraudulent concealment
by the doctor, the statute is tolled until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably
should discover, the negligent act. Requirements frequently mentioned
are that the fraudulent representations or actions must be expressly alleged
in the pleadings, 15 it must appear that the doctor had knowledge of the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865, 93 Am.St.Rep. 639 (1902).
37 Harvard L. Rev. 272, 273.
Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill.App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943); Graham v. Updegraph,
144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936); Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950);
cf., Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940).
Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb.
656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941); cf., Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950).
Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931); Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37,
38 P.2d 712 (1934) ; cf., Bernath v. Le Fever, 325 Pa. 43, 189 At. 342 (1937).
This appears to be the only basis of differentiation between Bernard v. Thompson
(the statute was tolled), 138 Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 (1942) and the case of
Carrell v. Denton (action was barred), 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (1942).
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negligent act, 10 and several cases have held it must be proved that a design
existed on the part of the doctor to avoid detection or delay the plaintiff
from seeking other information. 17 In addition, some courts have required
an allegation evidencing diligence on the part of the plaintiff in attempting
to discover the cause of action.18 In most of the cases, the necessary proof
of scienter on the part of the doctor imposes an extremely difficult barrier
to recovery. Those cases in which recovery has been permitted have
generally involved definite misleading statements by the doctor, 19 or
situations where unauthorized acts were performed during the course of the
operation without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff. 20

Other than

in these situations, it is a rare case in which the doctor's knowledge of the
negligent act can be proved and thus this exception is of little value in
preventing the harsh results of the majority rule.
A growing number of courts in recent years have permitted a tolling
of the statute for fraudulent concealment without the requirement of
scienter.2 ' Where a dental drill was left imbedded in the plaintiff's jawbone and not discovered within the prescriptive period, the court in
Morrison v. Acton 22 held the action was not barred. The court stated the
majority rule with exceptions, but recognized that ". .

neither of these

theories would be of aid to the plaintiff in the instant case for the reason
that there was no continuance of treatment and more than two years had
elapsed since the extractions. "23 The court concluded the defendant knew,
or was chargeable with knowledge that the drill had broken and was
imbedded in the plaintiff's jaw and because of his position of trust, the
failure to either disclose the injury or alleviate the condition constituted a
concealment amounting to legal or constructive fraud. Courts following
this theory generally hold the statute is tolled until the patient discovers
or is put upon reasonable notice of the breach of trust. By use of the
fiction of constructive knowledge, this view marks an abrupt departure
from the majority rule to an extent which permits its classification as a
separate and distinct minority rule.
While the cases following this rule of imputed knowledge are not
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147

(1952).

22.
23.

(1940); Saffold v. Scarborough, 91

Ga.App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955); Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452, 97
SW.2d 9 (1936).
De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt.
373, 154 At. 678 (1931).
Moses v. Miller, 202 Okla. 605, 216 P.2d 979 (1950). Reversed on other grounds in
268 P.2d 900; Colvin v. Warren, 44 Ga. 825, 163 S.E. 268 (1932). Reversed on other
grounds in 174 S.E. 257; Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940).
Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35 N.W.2d 351 (1949); Colvin v. Warren, 44 Ga.
825, r63 S.E. 268 (1932) see note 18.
Tabor v. Clifton, 63 Ga.App. 768, 12 S.E.2d 137 (1940).
Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948); Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark.
58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934) and Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256
S.W.2d 548 (1953); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1952); Schmucking v. Mayo,
183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931) (apparently will imply fraud as a result of the
confidential relationship); cf., Breedlove v. Aiken, 85 Ga. App. 719, 70 S.E.2d 85
68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948).
Morrison v. Acton, at page 594.
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completely in accord as to terminology and effect, the basic principle
appears to be an increased liberality in the construction of the statute with
the aid of definite fictions. The courts following this rule generally insist
upon an allegation that the doctor knew of the negligent act, or through the
26
exercise of reasonable diligence, 24 ordinary care, 25 or reasonable care
might have discovered it, before they will apply the theory. An allegation
of reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on the skill or assurances of the doctor
has been considered necessary in several cases.2 7 The date of discovery
should be set forth in the pleadings, togther with some form of allegation
showing diligence in attempting to discover the cause of action. Where
there was continuing treatment, the Arkansas court held that on the basis
of fraudulent concealment arising from imputed knowledge, the defendant
was guilty of continuing negligence. 28 However, in a subsequent case where
the treatment feature was absent, it was held that the effect of the concealment was to toll the statute. 29 Thus, it would appear that Arkansas is in
accord with the other jurisdictions on this point and will impute knowledge even where there is no subsequent treatment. While it depends on a
fiction, this rule effectively removes most of the objections to the majority
rule.
The most modern view holds that the statute of limitations in a malpractice action does not commence to run until the negligence is discovered,
or reasonably should be discovered. The discovery rule was probably first
advocated in the case of Hahn v. Claybrook,30 which involved a discoloration of the skin through excessive doses of argentum oxide. The court
followed the discovery rule, but held that the plaintiff should have discovered the injury more than three years prior to the commencement date of the
action. No serious attempt was made to use the discovery rule again until
the California case of Huysman v. Kirsch,3 ' involving a drainage tube which
was left in the plaintiff during an operation. The court announced several
theories in support of their ruling that the action was not barred, but the
rule which has subsequently been accepted as the holding of Huysman v.
Kirsch is that the statute does not commence to run until the date of
discovery, or the date when, by the exercise of reasonable care the plaintiff
should have discovered the wrongful injury. 32 The Huysman case overruled earlier California decisions following the majority rule.3 3 In the first
few decisions after Huysman v. Kirsch, the rule was combined with the end
of treatment; 34 however, the recent cases indicate that the two views are
24.
25.
26.
27.

Morrison v. Acton, see note 22.
Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934).
Proctor v. Schomberg, 63 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1953).
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So.
555 (La. 1934).
28. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934).
29. Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W2d 548 (1953).
30. 130 Md. 179, 100 At. 83, L.R.A. 1917C 1169 (1917).
31. 6 Cal.2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
32. Costa v. Regents of University of Calif., 116 Cal.App.2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953),
reversed on other grounds in 254 P.2d 85.
33. Gum v. Allen, 119 Cal.App. 293, 6 P.2d 311 (1931).
34. Greninger v. Fischer, 81 Cal.App.2d 549, 184 P.2d 694 (1947).
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now used independently.3 5 While the rule arose in a case involving foreign
substances, it has since been applied to negligent treatment 6 and the negli37
gent administration of drugs.
The current trend of decisions seems to indicate that the Huysman
holding, or at least the theory behind it, is a growing minority rule. In
some of the recent cases it is difficult to determine whether the discovery
rule is being followed or if the decision rests on implied fraud. The Colorado court, in a well-reasoned opinion involving a surgical sponge, held
that where the injury is concealed and the plaintiff has used every reasonable effort to discover the cause of his ailments, the statute is tolled.33 In
holding an action was not barred, the Louisiana court stated that the ". . .
doctrine that the prescriptive period does not commence until the injured
party discovers that he has been damaged is peculiarly applicable to a case
such as this . . .", because of the relationship between doctor and patient
39
and concluded that knowledge on the part of the doctor is immaterial.
A recent Florida case involving negligent X-ray treatment held that the
cause of action ". . . must be held to attach when the plaintiff was first
put upon notice or had reason to believe that her right of action had
accrued." 40 The court differentiated between notice of consequences and
notice of negligence and stated that in the latter situation the statute did
not commence to run until discovery. A recent case involved a suit by a
husband for the loss of services and companionship of his wife, who underwent a sterilization operation when advised not to have any more children
and subsequently became pregnant-resulting in serious injuries.4 ' The
North Dakota court held the action by the husband was not barred by the
statute which commenced to run at the date the wife became pregnant.
This would seem to indicate an application of the discovery rule, although
it was never specified as such by the court.
The real problem underlying the conflict of decisions, as outlined
above, would seem to be one of policy in determining the extent to which
doctors should be protected from litigation. Advocates of the majority or
early views have argued that the statute was passed because of the uncertain
results involved in the treatment of disease and the difficulty of tracing
those results as time passes. 42 It has also been asserted that a view other
than the majority rule would permit a patient to trace an affliction to an
original cause alleged to have happened years ago, with the result that no
practicing physician would ever be safe. 43 Another court even stated that
doctors were handicapped enough by the pitiable condition of malpractice

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal.App.2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1954); Hemingway v. Waxier,
128 Cal.App.2d 68, 274 P.2d 699 (1954).
Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal.2d 767, 271 P.2d 1 (1954).
Agnew v. Larson, 82 Cal.App.2d 176, 185 P.2d 851 (1947).
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 (La. 1934).
City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954).

41.

Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530, 173 A.L.R. 738 (1947).

42.
43.

Monohan v. Devinny, 131 Misc. 248, 225 N.Y.S. 601 (1927).
Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140 (1934).

35.
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victims without having to combat stale claims. 4 4 Those courts following the

modern views contend that the orbit of duty and liability should not be
drawn so as to protect the negligent. The Colorado court argued that the
statute was enacted for the purpose of promoting justice, discouraging unnecessary delay and forestalling the prosecution of stale claims-not for the
benefit of the negligent-and should not be construed to defeat justice. 45
In a recent case, 46 the dissenting judge stated that, in all probability, very
few reputable doctors would disagree that the policy of protecting the
medical practitioner from the danger of stale law suits should give way to
the policy of protecting the public from sub-standard medical care. The
dissent concluded with the apt statement that it was the job of the courts
to dispense justice rather than to dispense with justice.
It is submitted that current tort law adequately protects doctors from
unwarranted litigation without the added safeguard of the statute of limitations, which generally serves only to protect the negligent doctor from the
just claims of his patient. The general rule with respect to malpractice
decrees that the doctor is only liable where he fails to use that degree of
care and skill commonly possessed by members of the medical profession
in good standing in the same or similar localities. 41 This, in addition to
the rule that expert testimony is necessary unless the act is one which may
be regarded as within the common knowledge of laymen, has the effect of
protecting the doctor from unjust claims. However, where a claim is valid
the courts have a duty to prevent malpractice by making the doctor liable
for his negligent acts. It should be noted that most of the cases involving the
statute of limitations are examples of extreme negligence, or at least substandard medical practice, and involve situations where the doctor has left
sponges, drainage tubes, needles, surgical wire, dental drills, incision clips,
radium beads, forceps, roots of teeth and organs supposedly removed in the
body of his patient.

In fact, it has been said that ".

.

. their perusal would

almost lead to the conclusion that certain surgeons use such incisions as
waste baskets." 48 The social benefit of protecting doctors from unwarranted
litigation should not be extended to encompass cases of obvious negligence,
for certainly some sort of duty is owed to the public which is forced to rely
on the physician. As to the contention that an application of the modern
rules of discovery or implied fraud will open the flood gates of litigation,
it should be recognized that such a rule would apply only to malpractice
cases, of which there are no great number; also, the effect of such a rule is
only to permit the case to proceed past the pleading stage at which time
the plaintiff must still overcome the safeguards noted above.
An application of the modern rules will enhance the necessary position
of trust held by the doctor, while the majority rule serves only to under44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Ore. 688, 213 P.2d 797 (1950).
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954).
Prosser, Law of Torts (2nd ed., 1955) p. 133.
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944).

NoTEs
mine the confidence and co-operation necessary to the practice of medicine.
The average layman is unable to diagnose his pains and must rely on the
representations of the doctor, by means of which he can easily be misled.
In some jurisdictions, a negligent doctor need only postpone action by the
plaintiff for one year and the law will absolve him of liability. It is certainly both unreasonable and impractical to require a patient to go to
another doctor immediately after an operation to ascertain if the operation
has been performed correctly. Yet this is the logical result of permitting
an allegedly negligent doctor to lull his patient into believing that the use
of his hand will ultimately be restored by further operations and treatments
until such time as the statute has prevented any action for negligence, as was
done in Gangloff v. Apfelbach. 49 The doctor should have reasonable time
to correct unforseen results of the operation or treatment and should not
be harassed by premature litigation instituted in order to save the right
of the patient in the event that there is substantial malpractice. Likewise,
the patient should be permitted to rely on reasonable representations of
the physician without the necessity of keeping one eye on the calendar.
Competent physicians should not be hampered in their work by distrust
on the part of their patients created by the protection offered to negligent
practitioners by the statute of limitations as construed under the majority
rule. The modern rules do not make competent physicians subject to
increased liability, but do ensure that a negligent physician will be held
responsible for his actions.
It would appear from the modern trend, both through a judicial and a
legislative viewpoint, that courts are beginning to realize that only the
negligent physician is protected by the majority rule-at the expense of the
public and of competent practitioners. In cases decided since 1940, only
nine jurisdictions50 have consistently refused to toll the statutes or to
permit a portion of the action and two of these decisions were with strong
dissents. 5 ' On the other hand, eighteen jurisdictions have either held that
the statute was tolled, 52 or have permitted a portion to remain on a contract
49.
50.

51.
52.

319 Ill.App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943).
Alabama: Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940).
Kansas: Becker v. Floersch, 153 Kan. 374, 110 P.2d 752 (1941).
Mississippi: Wilder v. St. Joseph Hospital -.... Miss-.......
82 So.2d 651 (1955).
New Jersey: Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950).
North Carolina: Conner v. Schenck, 240 N.C. 794, 84 S.E.2d 175 (1954).
Ohio: De Long v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
Oregon: Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Ore. 688, 213 P.2d 797 (1950).
Texas: McFarland v. Connally, 252 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1952); but see Barnard v.
Thompson, 138 Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 (1942).
Washington: Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954).
De Long v. Campbell and Lindquist v. Mullen, see note 50.
Arkansas: Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
Arizona: Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948).
California: Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal.2d 767, 271 P.2d 1 (1954).
Colorado: Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372.
Florida: City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
Georgia: Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga.App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955).
Illinois: Dana v. Neuchiller, 2 Ill.App.2d 170, 118 N.E.2d 885 (1954); but see
Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill.App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943).
Kentucky: Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1952).

38
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theory. 53 In addition, several statutory reforms have been instigated. The
Missouri statute reads, in effect, that the cause of action will not accrue
at the date of the technical breach, but only when the resulting damage is
ascertainable and sustained.5 4 A statutory amendment has been proposed
in New York which would provide that the statute commences to run at
the date of the discovery, if within six years.5 5 It is interesting to note that
a statute designed to force adherence to the majority rule was disregarded
in a case 56 which followed the rule of implied fraud in an earlier decision 57
-which decision was apparently the cause of the amended statute.
In conclusion, it can be said that those cases involving the running
of the statute of limitations in a malpractice action should be considered an
exception to the general rules concerning the date of the accrual of the
cause of action. Because of the present protective rules concerning proof
of medical negligence and the difficulty of securing medical testimony in
the actual trial, the modern rules of either discovery or implied fraud
should be applied in such a situation by the courts. With respect to the
two modern views, probably the California discovery rule depends less on
fictions. However, either rule should reach an equitable solution in a
given case by permitting the case to proceed past the pleading stage. If
the claim is fallacious or unnecessary it will undoubtedly fail on proof, but
at least the plaintiff has been given his day in court.
While some courts have stated that they have no alternative other than
to follow the legislative dictates in holding that the words "after the cause
of action accrues" refers specifically to the date of the wrongful act, other
courts have construed the very same words to reach a more practical and
reasonable result. It has been pointed out that the courts have both a duty
and a right to make a judicial determination of the date of accrual where
the legislature fails to state when it shall accrue.58 The necessity for a
reasonable construction can probably be illustrated most clearly by using
the words of the Colorado court in Rosane v. Senger, when it was 'stated:
"It is ...an ancient maxim of the common law that 'Where there is a right
there is a remedy'. What a mockery to say to one, grievously wronged,
'Certainly you had a remedy, but while your debtor concealed from you the
fact that you had a right, the law stripped you of your remedy'." 59
JOHN

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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Massachusetts: cf., King v. Solomon, -81 N.E.2d 838 (Mass. 1948).
Michigan: Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35 N.W.2d 351 (1949).
Missouri: Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
Nebraska: Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941).
North Dakota: Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530, 173 A.L.R. 738 (1947).
Oklahoma: Moses v. Miller, 202 Okla. 605, 216 P.2d 979 (1950).
West Virginia: Baker v. Hendrix, 126 W.Va. 37, 27 S.E.2d 275 (1943).
Wisconsin: Krestich v. Stefanez, 243 Wis. 1, 9 N.W.2d 130, 151 A.L.R. 1022.
Connecticut: Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940).
New York: Matthews v. Pisani, 138 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1954).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516-100 (1949).
See 1942 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), 1942 Report, N.Y. Law Revision Commission 135, as
discussed in 27 St. John's L. Rev. 147, 150 (1942).
Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934).
Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954).
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).

